Antitrust and Federalism: A Response to Professor Wiley by Garland, Merrick B
Antitrust and Federalism: A Response to
Professor Wiley
Merrick B. Garlandf
Which values are so compelling that, in their defense, we should enlist
the federal judiciary to overturn political decisions made in the states?
The question is at the core of our constitutional law, but rarely raises its
head in antitrust. As I briefly argue here, however, a disagreement over
this question is what divides Professor Wiley's1 preferred test for preemp-
tion of state regulation by the Sherman Act from my own.' Professor Wi-
ley's test assumes that the maintenance of economic competition is a value
sufficiently compelling to justify judicial intervention in political decision-
making. While I do not dispute the importance of competition, the pre-
mise of my test is that it does not warrant such intervention. To avoid
further waterlogging our readers, I will forego discussing other points
raised in Professor Wiley's piece and focus on why I believe it is this
disagreement over the ordering of values that ultimately divides us.3
One clue can be found in Professor Wiley's defense of his preemption
test from First Amendment attack. Professor Wiley proposes that federal
courts should invalidate state regulations that (1) are economically ineffi-
cient and (2) originate from the lobbying efforts of "producers." To my
contention that the latter criterion-by imposing an absolute penalty upon
t Harvard University, A.B. 1974; J.D. 1977. Mr. Garland is a partner in the Washington, D.C.
law firm of Arnold & Porter and was a Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School during 1985-86.
1. See Wiley, Revision and Apology in Antitrust Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1277 (1987) [herein-
after Wiley, Revision and Apology]; Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 713 (1986) [hereinafter Wiley, Capture Theory].
2. See Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Eficiency and the Political Process, 96
YALE L.J. 486 (1987).
3. As a consequence, this reply will deal principally with the prescriptive elements of Professor
Wiley's capture theory. I continue, however, to regard his theory as descriptively inaccurate because it
accounts for few if any of the antitrust state action cases. Moreover, the trend of recent cases is the
opposite of that which the theory would predict. See Garland, supra note 2, at 490-98. Indeed, as
Professor Wiley concedes, the Supreme Court's most recent opinion, 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107
S. Ct. 720 (1987), provides no evidence to support his theory that the state action doctrine has been
shaped by a growing suspicion of regulation on the part of the Justices. See Wiley, Revision and
Apology, supra note 1, at 1280-82. On the contrary, as Justice Powell noted, see 107 S. Ct. at 724,
the analysis in 324 Liquor is a straightforward application of the test previously announced in Cali-
fornia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), the very test
Professor Wiley criticizes most sharply as an inappropriate response to his capture theory. See Wiley,
Revision and Apology, supra note 1, at 1278, 1280-82; Wiley, Capture Theory, supra note 1, at
729-39.
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producers' political activities-is inconsistent with the First Amendment,4
he responds by pointing to such cases as Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission5 and Washington v. Davis.6
In those cases, Professor Wiley suggests, the Supreme Court looked to
the intentions of those who supported regulations in order to determine
their validity-and did so without reference to First Amendment concerns.
But the difference between cases like Washington Apple and Davis, and
antitrust cases, is an important part of the difference between Professor
Wiley's argument and my own. In those cases, the Court examined intent
in order to vindicate compelling constitutional values-specifically the
protection of out-of-staters and racial minorities from local governmental
discrimination. Professor Wiley, by contrast, would overturn state legisla-
tion to vindicate a statutory interest in economic competition-an interest
the Court has found not to be constitutionally compelling.7 One may, of
course, dispute whether such an interest should be deemed as compelling
as the interest in barring discrimination. But one certainly need not re-
verse Washington Apple, as Professor Wiley implies, in order to criticize
his capture criterion on First Amendment grounds.8
An underlying disagreement over the ordering of values can also be
4. My contention does not "expand[] to assert that a court violates the First Amendment whenever
its historical investigation 'penalizes' political actors by supporting a judicial conclusion distasteful to
them." Wiley, Revision and Apology, supra note 1, at 1288. There is nothing wrong with a court
looking at legislative history in order to interpret the meaning of a statute. Professor Wiley's proposal,
however, runs afoul of the First Amendment because it makes the validity of legislation turn on the
identity of the person who lobbied for it. See Garland, supra note 2, at 512-18 (discussing Noerr and
Hartlage cases). Indeed, because a substantial percentage of state regulations will necessarily fail
Professor Wiley's efficiency criterion, see Garland, supra note 2, at 510, under his test their validity is
likely to depend solely on whose lobbying resulted in their enactment.
5. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
6. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Professor Wiley's further citation of Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579 (1976), is considered in detail in Garland, supra note 2, at 513 n.161.
7. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913-14 (1982) ("[Tihe right of
the people to petition their representatives in government 'cannot properly be made to depend on their
intent in doing so'. . . . This conclusion [is] not changed by the fact that the [defendants'] anticompe-
titive purpose produced an anticompetitive effect .... ") (quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961)).
8. See Wiley, Revision and Apology, supra note 1, at 1288.
There are also other significant First Amendment differences between Professor Wiley's analysis
and that employed in the cited cases. First, in large part, Wiley's test turns not on the intent but on
the identity of the sponsors of legislation, and is expressly aimed at deterring a specified class of
lobbyists ("producers") from seeking benefits through the political system. See Wiley, Capture The-
ory, supra note 1, at 743, 772-73. The Court has repeatedly condemned such efforts to discriminate
on the basis of a speaker's identity. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 106 S.
Ct. 903, 912 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 784-85 (1978).
In addition, to the extent Professor Wiley's test does turn on intent, it focuses on the intent of the
lobbyists who sought adoption of the regulations in question. See Wiley, Capture Theory, supra note
1, at 743. Washington Apple and Davis, by contrast, focus on the intent of the local governments that
enacted the regulations, entities whose speech is not protected by the First Amendment. See Washing-
ton Apple, 432 U.S. at 352; Davis, 426 U.S. at 238-39. Where these cases examine lobbyists' re-
marks, they do so only as one kind of evidence of the intent of the government. See Washington Apple,
432 U.S. at 352.
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discerned by examining Professor Wiley's defense of his proposed effi-
ciency criterion, which would direct federal courts to determine which
state regulations are economically inefficient. To my suggestion that this
criterion would replicate many of the evils of Lochner v. New York, 9 he
responds that judicial condemnation of Lochner did not result in the de-
mise of all forms of substantive due process. The survival of substantive
due process in some form, he argues, demonstrates that there is nothing
inherently objectionable about his own proposal for substantive judicial
scrutiny of state legislation.10
But, once again, the difference between the case law to which Professor
Wiley refers and the antitrust cases to which his test would apply is of
critical significance. Where the Court has continued to employ substantive
due process analysis in the post-Lochner era, it has done so to vindicate
interests such as the protection of free speech or minority rights. It has not
done so to vindicate a particular economic theory, whether it be the eco-
nomic efficiency of the Chicagoans or the just economic distribution that
Wiley suggests as an alternative."1
This is not the place to moot what was "wrong" with Lochner. The
question here is whether the economic efficiency or distribution notions
that Professor Wiley has sketched are sufficiently compelling to justify the
overriding of inconsistent political choices by state governments. The mod-
ern substantive due process cases provide no support for the proposition
that they are. Nor can I accept that the Sherman Act has made them
so-at least not without a substantially more explicit statement to that
effect than Congress has ever made.12
Finally, the disagreement that divides us is also implicit in Professor
Wiley's challenge to the test I prefer over his own for distinguishing be-
tween state action that should be vulnerable to, and state action that
should be immune from, Sherman Act attack. The better test, I suggest,
protects states' efforts to regulate their economies, while exposing to scru-
tiny state laws that do no more than delegate to business competitors the
power to restrain competition. The two-pronged requirement for immu-
nity enunciated in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Mid-
cal Aluminum, Inc.,13 which insists that the challenged restraint be
9. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
10. See Wiley, Revision and Apology, supra note 1, at 1289.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); G. GuNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 518, 540-44 (10th ed. 1980).
12. Far from "direct[ing] the judiciary to exercise federal supervision over local policy" as Profes-
sor Wiley contends, Wiley, Revision and Apology, supra note 1, at 1289, the Local Government
Antitrust Act of 1984 constituted a stiff congressional rebuke to judicial intrusion upon local poli-
cymaking. See Garland, supra note 2, at 495 & nn.54, 55.
13. 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
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"clearly articulated" as state policy and "actively supervised" by the state
itself is, in my view, a tolerable proxy for such a result. 14
The problem with this test, according to Professor Wiley, is that it as-
sertedly makes use of a "public/private distinction." Scholars, he con-
tends, have demonstrated that such a distinction is not "natural," but
rather must express the pursuit of some underlying value. But the schol-
arship to which Professor Wiley refers 1 -which questions the use of such
a distinction in Fourteenth Amendment "state action" analysis-does not
cast doubt upon the antitrust preemption test I argue for here.
First, despite the Court's unfortunate use of the phrase "state action" in
its antitrust opinions, cases like Midcal do not seek to separate state from
private action. On the contrary, they assume that both kinds of "action"
under consideration (state regulation and state delegation) are actions of
the state, and instead seek to separate that state action which is preempted
by the Sherman Act from that which is not.
Second, I agree that this line is not a "natural" one, and that it does
reflect a set of underlying values. Those values do not encompass a belief
in the inherent benefit of economic regulation, but rather a respect for the
political process that chooses it. Application of antitrust concepts to state
law would drastically reduce the scope of state regulation, even as com-
pared to Senator Sherman's time."6 It is a respect for the decisions of
elected local governments that counsels hesitation in adopting such a dra-
matic restructuring of American federalism in the absence of any mention
of the possibility in the legislative history of the antitrust laws.17
Even this respect must be tempered by federal concerns, however, when
the state seeks to do little more than delegate to business competitors the
right to violate the Sherman Act. This is not because state laws that sim-
ply permit businesses to do as they please are necessarily any less close "to
the 'true' hearts and minds of state citizens" than state-administered regu-
lations."8 Rather, it is because such laws-for example, a law that says
"you may act as you please in fixing prices"-offend the Sherman Act in
the most direct possible way. Their preemption seems the minimum nec-
essary to prevent evisceration of the federal antitrust laws, without at the
same time threatening the entire structure of federalism-as would the
preemption of all "inefficient," "producer-initiated" state regulations.
14. See Garland, supra note 2, at 499-501.
15. See, e.g., Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296 (1982).
16. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
17. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) ("In a dual system of government in which
. the states are sovereign, . . . an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers
and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.").
18. Wiley, Revision and Apology, supra note 1, at 1279.
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Professor Wiley is right in saying that the antidelegation rule just de-
scribed is not the product of a "simple regard for federal antitrust policy"
alone.19 He errs, however, in looking only to policies internal to the Sher-
man Act-be they economic efficiency or the just distribution of consumer
surplus-to determine how Congress would have wanted that Act applied
to legislation passed by the states. Application of the Sherman Act to such
legislation has implications for values far more fundamental to our society
than those contained within the four corners of antitrust law alone, values
which Congress shares and which therefore must be taken into account in
any effort to divine congressional intentions. It is to those more fundamen-
tal values-particularly a respect for the political processes of American
federalism-that the antidelegation rule responds.
19. Id. at 1279.
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